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SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY? THE IRS' 
ADVANCED NOTICE OF RULEMAKING 
REGARDING CAPITALIZATION 
By CheyaIina L. Jaffket 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being lost in a maze where the instructions to the exit are 
written in a way that is subject to many interpretations. Along the way, 
you stop and ask people for some direction in interpreting the instruc-
tions. You find that there are as many different interpretations as 
there are people to ask. You want to exit the maze but a wrong turn 
could be dangerous or costly. Once you reach what seems to be the 
exit, you feel a sense of relief. But, the next time you enter the maze, 
you find that it has changed. You have difficulty finding the exit 
again. Past experience in the maze does not help you. You find that 
you are once again lost, and so you start all over again. 
This is the situation that many taxpayers face when determining if 
something is an expenditure that must be capitalized or an expense 
that is currently deductible. The tax code and regulations are vague 
at best. On this issue, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued 
inconsistent guidelines. The various courts have held that the same or 
similar expenditures between different taxpayers are subject to differ-
ent treatment. Even tax practitioners do not agree on when some-
thing should be capitalized or expensed. 
In an effort to provide guidance, the IRS announced in an ad-
vanced notice of proposed rule making that it would promulgate reg-
ulations regarding the capitalization or deduction of various 
expenditures. 1 The proposed regulations would address various is-
sues, including a regulation that would permit taxpayers to immedi-
ately deduct "regular and recurring" expenses.2 The impetus of the 
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1. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
2. Id. at 3462. 
51 
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proposed regulations originates from u.s. Freightways v. Commissioner,3 
where the seventh circuit chided the IRS for inconsistency regarding 
the application of the capitalization rules. 4 
The seminal case in the area of capitalization was INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,5 decided by the Supreme Court in 1992. The IRS, the 
courts, and taxpayers are still wrestling with the determination of 
when an item should be deducted or capitalized. Unfortunately, no 
bright line rule has emerged, and guidance is needed in this area of 
confusion. IRS regulations, however, are not the proper means to 
provide this guidance, especially in the area of a "regular and recur-
ring rule." This rulemaking would be encroaching on the purview of 
Congress. 
A glance at the proposed regulations and the resulting taxpayers' 
comments suggest that the proposal may be too taxpayer-friendly. 
This raises the question of whether the new kinder, gentler IRS is too 
kind and too gentle. Why is the IRS bowing to the influence of the 
business industry and creating rules that favor taxpayers? 
Generally, regulations are seen as interpreting the intent of Con-
gress in relationship to a particular code section. However, any pro-
posed regulation that creates an exception for a "regular and 
recurring rule" would be creating new law, not interpreting the old 
law.6 The IRS lacks the authority to issue regulations that create new 
law. Therefore, the IRS and taxpayers should seek the necessary gui-
dance from the body that is empowered to provide it, Congress. 
Part II of this article provides a general background related to the 
issue of deducting and capitalizing expenditures and will describe the 
basic accounting principles that are necessary to fully comprehend 
the consequences of the IRS' ill-advised efforts to provide guidance. 
Part III illustrates why the IRS lacks the authority to issue these types 
of regulations, and discusses the reason why this authority is properly 
vested in Congress. Part IV explores the problems with a "regular and 
recurring" exception to the capitalization rules. Finally, Part V of this 
article concludes that Congress, and not the IRS, is the proper author-
ity to offer desperately needed guidance in the area of capitalization 
and deduction of expenditures. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Methods of Accounting 
The Internal Revenue Code permits taxpayers to report their in-
come based upon the method of accounting that they use to keep 
3. 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001). 
4. Id. at 1141-42. 
5. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
6. See infra Part III. 
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their books.7 Additionally, the Code lists various methods of account-
ing that are acceptable.8 The vast majority of taxpayers are either cash 
method taxpayers or accrual method taxpayersY 
1. Cash Method of Accounting 
The majority of individuals use the cash method of accounting. lO 
Under the cash method of accounting, a taxpayer is required to re-
port income "for the year that amounts are actually or constructively 
received"ll and takes deductions when expenses are paid. 12 Cash 
method taxpayers' money flow is closely tied to their reporting of in-
come and deduction. 13 Income and expenses follow the money. Sec-
tion 448 (a) (1) prohibits C-corporationsl4 from using the cash method 
of accounting.15 Therefore, C-corporations tend to use the other 
most common method of accounting, the accrual method.16 
2. Accrual Method of Accounting 
Under the accrual method of accounting, taxpayers report income 
when the "all-events test" is met.17 This test is satisfied when all-events 
have occurred that fix the right to the income and the amount of the 
income can be determined with reasonable accuracy.18 Accrual tax-
payers are permitted to take deductions when the "all-events test" is 
met and economic performance has occurred. 19 The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that "a liability does not accrue as long as it remains 
contingent."20 Therefore, in order to comply with the "all-events test," 
7. 26 U.S.C. § 446(a) (1984). All references to code sections are references to 
the Internal Revenue Code codified in Title 26 of the United States Code. 
How a taxpayer keeps his or her books refers to the method of financial 
accounting the taxpayer uses. 
8. 26 U.S.C. § 446(c) (1984). 
9. See 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 15.03 (2d ed. 2002). 
10. See 2 MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12A:03 (2002). 
11. [d.; see 26 U.S.C. § 451(a) (1998); also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 20 (7th ed. 
1999). 
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1 (a) (1) (1999). 
13. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(l) (2002); MERTENS, supra note 10, 
§ 12A:03. 
14. See generally BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999) (defining C corpo-
ration as "raJ corporation whose income is taxed through it rather than 
through its shareholders"). 
15. 26 U.S.C.A. § 448(a) (1) (West 2002). 
16. See MERTENS, supra note 10, § 12A:04. 
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii)(A) (2001). 
18. [d. 
19. See id. 
20. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193,200 (1934); accord Dixie Pine Prods. Co. 
v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944). 
54 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
a liability must be "final and definite in amount,"21 "fixed and abso-
lute,"22 and unconditiona1.23 
Economic performance24 is a requirement that Congress created in 
order to prohibit taxpayers from taking advantage of the time value of 
money when taking deductions. 25 In essence, it was to prevent taxpay-
ers from accelerating deductions by prepaying them. Generally, 
under the accrual method a taxpayer's income and deductions do not 
follow the money flOW. 26 
B. Deductions 
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace.27 Congress provided 
these deductions in Parts VI, VII, and VIII of the Internal Revenue 
Code, section 161 through section 249.28 Section 161 states: "In com-
puting taxable income ... there shall be allowed as deductions the 
items specified in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part 
IX."29 
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code is the trade or business 
deduction provision. It permits taxpayers to deduct from their gross 
income those expenses that are "ordinary and necessary" and "paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business."3o 
Therefore, in order for something to be currently deductible it 
must be an expense. Otherwise, it is an expenditure. If an item is an 
expenditure, it is covered by part IX, "Items Not Deductible," which 
includes section 263Y Section 263 denies a deduction for those items 













Security Flour Mills Co. v. Comm'r, 321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944). 
Brown, 291 U.S. at 20l. 
Lucas v. N. Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930). 
For a more detailed explanation of economic performance see Part IV.C.l. 
H.R. REp. No. 98-432 at 1254 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 697, 
917. 
See Baird v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 1958) (stating "an 'accrual 
method' means that you report income when earned, even if not received, 
and deduct expenses when incurred, even if not paid, within the taxable 
period"). 
See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84; Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 
590,593 (1943); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colo-
nial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 
See 26 U.S.CA §§ 161-249 (West 2002). 
26 U.S.C.A. § 16l. 
26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a). 
See 26 U.S.CA §§ 261-80. 
See 26 U.S.CA § 263. 
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1. Section 162 
In order for a taxpayer to qualify for a deduction under section 162, 
the item must meet five requirements.33 The item must "(1) be 'paid 
or incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any trade 
or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary' expense, and 
(5) be an 'ordinary' expense."34 Each item must be met indepen-
dently in order to qualify for a deduction. 
An item is ordinary if it is the kind of expense that is common in 
the business community to which the taxpayer belongs.35 An ordinary 
expense is not necessarily one that the taxpayer must pay on a regular 
basis.36 Although, sometimes, of course, an ordinary item will be one 
that the taxpayer regularly incurs. _ 
An item is necessary if it is helpful and appropriate to the particular 
business of the taxpayer. 37 Generally a court will not substitute its 
judgment for what is helpful and appropriate to the business, for that 
of the taxpayer.38 
The requirement that an item must be paid or incurred in the car-
rying on of a business39 generally presupposes an existing business.4o 
For example, expenses of investigating or creating a business would 
not be paid or incurred while carrying on business.41 Therefore, 
these expenses would not be deductible under section 162.42 A tax-
payer would have to look to other code provisions to recover the cost 
of those expenditures, namely section 195.43 
The expense must be for a trade or business.44 A trade or business 
depends upon how the taxpayer engages in the activity.45 In order for 
the activity to qualify as a trade or business, the taxpayer's activity must 
be regular and continuous with the primary purpose of the activity 
being profit or income.46 Therefore, a taxpayer that holds herself out 
to others as selling goods or services would be engaged in a trade or 
business.47 
33. See Comm'r v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). 
34. Id. (quoting from I.RD § 162(a) (1954)). 
35. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1933). 
36. See id. at 114. 
37. See id. at 113. 
38. See id. at 115. 
39. Frank v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 511, 513 (1953). 
40. Id. at 513-14. 
41. Id. at 513. 
42. Seeid.at514. 
43. Id. 
44. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987). 
45. Id. at 29. 
46. Id. at 30. 
47. See id. at 31. 
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By and large, the element often in question is whether or not the 
item is an expense or an expenditure. In order to analyze the issue 
one must seek guidance from section 263 and its regulations. 
2. Section 263 
Section 263 is the starting point for determining if something is an 
expenditure. The statute itself is of little assistance. It merely denies a 
deduction for items that are "new buildings or for permanent im-
provements or betterments."48 Turning to the regulations, the key 
language describes an expenditure as "property having a useful life 
substantially beyond the taxable year."49 If the taxpayer's payment 
creates or enhances an asset that has a useful life substantially beyond 
the tax year, then the taxpayer cannot currently deduct the pay-
ment.50 The taxpayer must capitalize the payment, meaning that the 
taxpayer will recover the cost via depreciation, amortization, or upon 
sale.51 
The language of the regulation created the confusion that led to 
the proposed regulations. Taxpayers, the IRS, and courts have been 
wrestling with whether and when something is substantially beyond 
the taxable year. The seminal case that attempted to answer these 
questions was INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner. 52 
C. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner 
A taxpayer incurred investment banking, legal and other costs in 
the course of a friendly takeover.53 The taxpayer sought to immedi-
ately deduct these costs under section 162.54 The IRS argued that the 
taxpayer must capitalize the expense under section 263.55 The tax-
payer made its arguments based on the Supreme Court's holding in 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n56 that expenses that 
"create or enhance ... a separate and distinct additional asset" must 
be capitalized.57 The taxpayer argued that this created a test that lim-
ited when expenses must be capitalized.58 
48. 26 U.S.C.A. § 263(a) (1) (West 1997). 
49. 26 C.F.R. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (2002). 
50. Comm'r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 361 (1971). 
51. 1 BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS § 20.4.1 (1981). 
52. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
53. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 82 (1992) (holding that invest-
ment banking, legal, and other expenses incurred in friendly takeover did 
not qualifY for a deduction as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 83 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1) (1994)). 
56. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). 
57. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83 (quoting Lincoln, 403 U.S. at 354). 
58. Id. at 86. 
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However, the Court noted that "deductions are exceptions to the 
norm of capitalization."59 Therefore, deductions should be "strictly 
construed," meaning that deductions would only be allowed if "there 
is a clear provision therefore."6o The Court in INDOPCO limited Lin-
coln Savings to the proposition that "the creation of a separate and 
distinct asset may well be a sufficient, but not a necessary condition to 
classification as a capital expenditure."61 The Court proceeded to 
state that the indicia of capitalization includes "a taxpayer's realization 
of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred [and 
that it] is undeniably important in determining whether the appropri-
ate tax treatment is [an] immediate deduction or capitalization."62 
INDOPCO's guidance falls far short of a bright line rule on when an 
asset should be capitalized; rather, it suggested an examination of the 
potential incidental future benefit of the asset and the "amorphous" 
nature of the asset itself.63 The Court stated that "an incidental future 
benefit-'some future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization."64 
Courts, the IRS and taxpayers have been unable to reach a consensus 
on what is meant by "an incidental future benefit." 
D. u.s. Freightways v. Commissioner 
This lack of consensus culminated in U.S. Freightways v. Commis-
sioner.65 The taxpayer, an accrual method calendar year C- corpora-
tion, incurred over $5 million for fees, licenses, insurance and permits 
(FLIP expenses) in order to operate its fleet of trucks.66 These ex-
penses were for exactly one year, but because of various due dates, 
some of the expenses carried over into the following calendar year.67 
According to the taxpayer's financial records, fifty-five percent of the 
expenses were allocable to the following calendar year. 68 
The taxpayer argued that it should be able to deduct the expenses 
all in the year paid, rather than allocating the expenses among the 
two years covered by the expenses.69 The IRS argued that, because 
the benefit of the expenses extended substantially beyond the close of 
the tax year the taxpayer was required to capitalize the expenses.70 
59. Id. at 84. 
60. !d. (quoting New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 u.s. 435, 440 (1934»; 
see also Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). 
61. INDOPCO, 543 U.S. at 87. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 87, n.6. 
64. Id. at 87 (emphasis in original). 
65. 113 T.C. 329 (1999), rev'd 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001). 
66. See id. at 330-31. 
67. Id. 
68. U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 2001). 
69. See Freightways, 113 T.C. at 330-31. 
70. Id. at 331. 
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Because the taxpayer was an accrual method taxpayer, it could only 
deduct the expenses if the "all-events test" was met and if economic 
performance had occurred.71 The "all-events test" requires that all 
events have occurred, which establish liability and that the amount 
can be determined with reasonable accuracy.72 There was no ques-
tion in this case that the "all-events test" was met as to the FLIP 
expenses. 73 
Additionally, an accrual method taxpayer may not deduct the ex-
pense until economic performance has occurred.74 According to the 
regulations, economic performance for the FLIP expenses occurred 
as the taxpayer paid the expenses.75 Under a strict application of the 
accrual method of accounting, the taxpayer would have been able to 
deduct the FLIP expenses if the benefit of the payments was limited to 
the tax year of the payment.76 
The IRS used section 446(b) to argue that the taxpayer's method of 
accounting did not clearly reflect income for the FLIP expenses.77 
The IRS further argued that the proper method of accounting for 
these expenses was to prorate the expenses between the two tax years 
that were covered by the FLIP expenses. 78 The taxpayer already pro-
rated the expenses in this way for financial accounting purposes. 79 
In the tax court, the taxpayer argued that the "one-year rule" that 
applies to cash method taxpayers should apply to accrual method tax-
payers.80 The judicially created "one-year rule" permits cash method 
taxpayers to deduct a prepayment of expenses in the year paid, so 
long as the prepayment did not extend more than 12 months from 
the end of the tax year of the payment.81 
The tax court recognized the distinction between cash method tax-
payers and accrual method taxpayers, explaining that the application 
of some rules would hinge on the method employed by individual tax-
payers.82 In accord with precedent, the tax court limited the applica-
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c)(l) (ii) (A)(2001). 
72. See id. 
73. See Freightways, 113 T.C. at 330 (stating that the company paid for licenses 
necessary to conduct business). 
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii) (A) (2002). 
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(5) & (6) (2002). 
76. See Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1143 (discussing that the problem with the FLIP 
expenses is not that they last longer than 365 days, but that they fall over 
two tax years). 
77. See Freightways, 113 T.C. at 337. 
78. [d. at 331. 
79. [d. at 330-31. 
80. See id. at 335. 
81. Zaninovich v. Comm'r, 616 F.2d 429,432 n.6 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'g, 69 T.C. 
605 (1978). 
82. Freightways, 113 T.e. at 336. 
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tion of the "one-year rule" to cash method taxpayers, negating the 
possibility of applying the rule to accrual method taxpayers.83 
On appeal, the seventh circuit reversed the holding of the tax 
court.84 First, the court of appeals examined the level of deference 
afforded the Commissioner's interpretation of the term "substantially" 
within the regulations.85 The court of appeals decided that the Com-
missioner's interpretation warranted less deference than granted in 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council86 because of the informality 
of the Commissioner's interpretation.87 
Second, the court then examined the regulation that requires capi-
talization for benefits that extend substantially beyond the tax year,88 
but only after noting that the language of the regulation was identical 
for cash method taxpayers and accrual method taxpayers.89 The court 
opined that because of the identical language, the Commissioner's in-
terpretation must be consistent between cash and accrual method tax-
payers.90 The court also noted that the Commissioner's 
interpretation lacked consistency between accrual method taxpayers; 
therefore, the court afforded the Commissioner's interpretation little 
deference.91 
After turning its attention to the recurring nature of the FLIP ex-
penses,92 the court held that the "one-year rule" also applies to accrual 
method taxpayers.93 It is unclear from the court's opinion, whether 
the "one-year rule" would apply to accrual method taxpayers that do 
not have recurring expenses. 
E. Advanced Notice Of Rulemaking 
On January 24, 2002, the IRS issued an advanced notice of pro-
posed rulemaking regarding the promulgation of regulations for sec-
tion 263(a).94 The notice for the proposed section recognized that 
the "fundamental purpose of section 263(a) is to prevent the distor-
tion of taxable income through current deduction of expenditures re-
83. [d. at 337. 
84. 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001). 
85. [d. at 1141-42. 
86. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts afford agency administrators def-
erence when interpreting regulations where congressional intent is 
unclear). 
87. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1142. 
88. [d. at 1143-45. 
89. [d. at 1143. 
90. [d. 
9l. [d. at 1145. 
92. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1145-47. 
93. [d. at 1147. 
94. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1). 
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lating to the production of income in future taxable years."95 The 
purpose of this proposed section is "[t]o reduce the administrative 
and compliance costs associated with section 263(a)."96 
The proposed regulations give certain havens to taxpayers includ-
ing the "one-year rule" and "de minimis rules."97 Under the "one-year 
rule," expenditures that relate "to intangible assets or benefits whose 
lives are of a relatively short duration are not required to be capital-
ized."98 The "de minimis rules" would permit specific expenditures to 
be deducted when they fall below a certain dollar amount.99 
The proposal also stated that the IRS would consider a "regular and 
recurring rule," which would permit "costs incurred in transactions 
that occur on a regular and recurring basis in the routine operation of 
a taxpayer's trade or business" to be immediately deductible. lOo 
Part III focuses on the "regular and recurring rule," and takes the 
position that the IRS lacks the authority to issue regulations on this 
topic.10l It further argues that even if the IRS has the authority, Con-
gress is in the best position to offer taxpayers guidance concerning 
the "regular and recurring rule."102 Finally, Part IV argues that any 
proposed regulation that offers a "regular and recurring rule" would 
be inappropriate, because it conflicts with Congress' rule regarding 
recurring items in section 461 (h)( 3) . 
III. THE IRS LACKS THE AUTHORIlYTO ISSUE REGULATIONS 
Under the administrative law policies, agencies can promulgate two 
types of regulations: legislative and interpretative. 103 The basic differ-
ence between these two regulations is how the regulations are promul-
gated. 104 Generally, legislative regulations comply with the 
Administrative Procedures Act and are subject to public notice and 





99. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed]an. 24, 2002)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1). 
100. Id. 
101. See infra Part III.C. 
102. See infra Part I1I.C. 
103. William G. Andreozzi, Prohibiting the Deduction for Non-Corporate Tax Defi-
ciency Interest: When Treasury Goes Too Far, 34 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 557, 576 
(2001); see also Elizabeth Williams, What Constitutes ''Interpretative Rule" of 
Agency so as to Exempt Such Action From Notice Requirements of Administrative 
Procedure Act (5 U.S.G.S. § 553(b)(3)(A)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347 (1995). 
104. Naftali Z. Dembitzer, Beyond the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: 
Perceived Abuses of the Treasury Department's Rulemaking Authority, 52 TAX LAw. 
501,503 (Spring 1999). 
105. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b)-(c) (West 1996); see also CHARLES H. KOCH,]R., AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4.11[2] (2d ed. 1997). 
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quired under the Administrative Procedures Act to be subject to pub-
lic notice and comment. 106 Because legislative and interpretive 
regulations have different authorization requirements, the procedural 
steps needed to promulgate the regulations vary. 107 
A. Tax Regulations 
However, in the tax arena, the two different regulations are not 
based upon how they are promulgated. lOS Almost all of the treasury 
regulations that address a tax issue have been subject to public notice 
and comment in compliance with the Administrative Procedures 
Act. 10g The difference between the two types of regulations is gener-
ally the authority under which the Secretary promulgates the 
regulations. 1 10 
1. Legislative 
Legislative regulations are those regulations in which Congress has 
expressly granted the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations 
for a particular code section,ul It is generally viewed that legislative 
regulations are the result of an incomplete code section in which Con-
gress envisions the Secretary and his agent, the Commissioner, com-
pleting the code section with regulationsY2 For example, in section 
1 (g) (7)( C), Congress grants the Secretary specific authority to "pre-
scribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry 
out the purposes of this paragraph. "11 3 Therefore, any regulations is-
sued by the Secretary that deal with the election to claim certain 
unearned income of a child on the parent's return would be legisla-
tive regulations. 1 14 
2. Interpretive 
Interpretive regulations are those regulations that the Secretary is-
sues pursuant to the authority granted to him under section 7805.115 
106. 5 U.S.CA § 553(b) (3) (A) (West 1996). 
107. See KOCH, supra note 105, at § 4.11 [3]. 
108. Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FlA. TAX 
REv. 51, 56 (1996). 
109. ld. at 57. 
110. Id. at 56-57. 
111. Id. at 56. 
112. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); 
see also John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rul-
ings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35, 69-70 (1995); Jason T. 
Bell, Comment, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. United States: Using a Balanced 
Approach to Review a Treasury Regulation Issued Pursuant to the Commissioner's 
General Authority, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 449, 454 (2000). 
113. 26 U.S.CA § 1(g)(7)(C) (West 2001). 
114. See id.; see also Aprill, supra note 108, at 56-57. 
115. 26 U.S.CA § 7805(a) (West 1989)(stating "the Secretary shall prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, mcluding all 
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When Congress does not grant specific authority to enact regulations 
to enforce a particular code section, then the code section is viewed as 
complete.1l6 Any regulations would serve only to interpret the law as 
given by Congress. 117 Most tax regulations are interpretive 
regulations. 
B. The Proposed Regulations 
In its advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the IRS cites section 
263 as the code section for which the proposed regulations will be 
issued. 118 An examination of section 263 reveals no specific authority 
within the section for the Secretary to issue regulations to enforce the 
code section.1l9 Therefore, the regulations would have to be promul-
gated under the authority of section 7805 and will be interpretive 
regulations. 
Because the regular and recurring rule will permit the immediate 
expensing of trade or business expenses, an examination of section 
162 is unwarranted. Section 162(h) (3) grants the Secretary authority 
to prescribe regulations relating to the time and manner of an elec-
tion that state legislatures can make regarding their expenses as state 
legislatures. 120 Section 162 contains no other grants of specific 
authority. 
Because neither section 162 nor section 263 grants the Secretary 
specific authority to prescribe these regulations, the proposed regula-
tions would be interpretive regulations. However, the regulations will 
be subject to the same public notice and comment as legislative 
regulations. 
c. Why The IRS Lacks Authority 
Section 7805 grants authority for necessary rules. 121 That is not to 
say that rules and regulations are not needed in section 263 and the 
determination of when an expenditure should be capitalized. How-
ever, that authority should be interpreted narrowly so that not any 
regulation can be promulgated under the auspices of a particular 
code section, when that regulation greatly exceeds or contradicts the 
intent of Congress. 
rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law 
in relation to internal revenue"); see also Aprill, supra note lOS, at 56. 
116. Coverdale, supra note 112, at 70; see also Bell, supra note 112, at 454. 
117. See Coverdale, supra note 112, at 69-70. 
lIS. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 
Fed. Reg. 3461,3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1). 
119. 26 U.S.CA § 263 (West 1997). 
120. 26 U.S.CA § 162(h)(3) (West 2000). 
121. 26 U.S.CA § 7S05(a) (West 1995). 
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The Supreme Court has stated that the Secretary cannot use his 
rulemaking authority to create new law. 122 A "regular and recurring" 
rule would be just that, a new law. It would fit under the auspices of 
an exception to the norm of capitalization. In other words, some-
thing that should be capitalized absent the rule will now be deductible 
if it is a regular and recurring item in the taxpayer's business. It has 
been repeatedly recognized that capitalization is the norm and that 
deductions need to be narrowly construed. 123 In effect, although the 
regulation would appear to be an exception to the capitalization 
norm, it would, in fact, act as a deduction. 
Section 263(a) disallows deductions for capital expenditures. 124 
Therefore, a taxpayer needs another code section allowing the deduc-
tion. 125 The taxpayer will turn to section 162. However, the regula-
tion seems to add an additional intermittent aspect to the expense 
element of section 162.126 It would create a new test for the expense 
element of section 162. The taxpayer would ask first, is the item regu-
lar and recurring? If yes, then the expense element is met. The tax-
payer would never get to section 263. 
This contradicts Congress' intent of capitalization being the 
norm. 127 Under section 162, Congress indicated, and the courts have 
recognized, that an expense is a required element for deduction, 
which requires an analysis of, and comparison with, section 263. 128 
Congress enacted section 263 so that taxpayers would be forced to 
analyze their expenses to properly match income with expenses. 129 
However, a regular and recurring rule would permit taxpayers to side 
step this necessary, but difficult examination. The result would be a 
lack of matching of income and expenses, and the opportunity for 
abuse. Taxpayers could pre-pay regular and recurring expenses that 
would otherwise have to be capitalized in order to accelerate the tax 
benefits. 
122. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 467 (1883). 
123. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1991); see supra Part II.C. 
124. 26 U.S.CA § 263(a) (West 2002). 
125. See 26 U.S.CA § 161 (West 2002). 
126. See 26 U.S.CA § 162(a) (2000). 
127. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84; see Alan Gunn, The Requirement that a Capitall!-x-
penditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COMMERCIAL L. REv. 
443 (1974);John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A Result in 
Search ofa Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 473 (1981). 
128. Comm'r v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971) (quoting 
I.R.C. § 162(a)); see al50 John Lee et aI., Restating Capitalization Standards and 
Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIO N. U. L. REv. 
631,633 (1997). 
129. See Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); see also Peter L. 
Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAw. 607, 612 (1994). 
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Because the proposed regulations would conflict with the intent of 
Congress in enacting sections 263 and 162, the regulations would be 
improper under section 7805. 130 
D. Congress Is the Proper Actor 
Although the IRS consists of experts on tax law, the agency's pur-
pose is to interpret and administer the tax laws, not make them. 131 
Enacting the proposed regulation, or a similar one, would be creating 
a new law.132 The IRS is attempting to make sense of the widespread 
confusion that has followed INDOPCO by enacting this regulation. 
However, the various and often conflicting judicial, as well as, IRS in-
terpretations demand that Congress intervene and resolve the issue of 
capitalization versus deduction. 
One of the IRS' charges is to protect the interest of the public trea-
sury.133 Another is to represent the best interest. of the govern-
ment. 134 In compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act, the 
IRS will submit the proposed regulation for public notice and com-
ment.135 Various taxpayers and taxpayer entities will make comments 
regarding the regulations. However, because of widespread support 
for the regulation, as seen by the comments sought by the proposed 
regulation,136 the regulation may not necessarily result in the best law, 
which is in the best interest of the government. 
130. See Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 16; Guidance Regarding Deduction and Cap-
italization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 
2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also I.R.C. §§ 7805, 263 (2002). 
131. See David A. Brennen, Treasury Ref5Ulations and judicial Deference in the Post-
Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 387, 388 (1997). 
132. See George Hertz, IRS Agent Criticizes Proposed Guidance on Rules on Capitaliz-
ing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002), available at 
LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 61-22; see also Samuel E. Whitley, 
Writer Criticizes Proposed Guidance on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 
2002 TNT 61-24. 
133. U.S. v. Hughes Properties, Inc. 476 U.S. 593, 603 (1986); Thor Power Tool 
Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979). 
134. Coverdale, supra note 112, at 71. 
135. Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 5 U .S.C. § 553 (West 1994). 
136. Deborah Aiken, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Accounting Guidance Gets Thumbs 
Up, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Le-
gal News, 2002 TNT 92-9; Mark R. Baran, Bankers Association Offers Sugges-
tions For Rules on CaPitalizing Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 
5, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 66-26; Cathe-
rine Barre & Keith Lawson, Investment Institute Suggests Changes to Capitaliza-
tion Rules for Intangible Assets, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 2, 2002), available 
atLEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, TNT 63-15; Pamela]. Pecarich, AICPA Sug-
gests Changes to Proposed Regs on CaPitalizing Expenditures, TAX NOTES TO-
DAY (May 17, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 
66-26; Frederick H. Robinson, Attorney nxpresses Support for Capitalization 
Rules for Intangible Assets, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 2, 2002), available at 
LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 63-l4. 
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Very few of the comments regarding the proposed regulations are 
negative. 137 The fear is that the IRS will attempt to draft the regula-
tion in a manner that is too favorable to the taxpayer and unfavorable 
to the government. 13S In proposing such a regulation, the IRS is 
abandoning its responsibilities in favor of appeasing taxpayers. 
Once the regulation has survived the notice and comment proce-
dure and is enacted, courts will generally grant the regulation Chevron 
deference.139 With this level of deference, the government's interest 
becomes harder to protect. 140 If the IRS fails to protect the govern-
ment's interest at the first level, the promulgation stage, then Con-
gress cannot assume that the IRS will act in the government's best 
interest when carrying out the regulations. 141 This failure requires 
the courts to intercede. However, because of Chevron, most courts will 
feel uncomfortable assuming this role. 142 With the IRS abandoning 
its responsibilities and the courts unlikely to act, Congress will be 
forced to enact legislation to correct the problem. Because it is likely 
that Congress will have to respond to the issue at some time, it is bet-
ter to have Congress respond sooner than later. 
The IRS has been inconsistent in the interpretation of when some-
thing should be capitalized.143 Will the proposed regulations resolve 
the tendency to be inconsistent regarding capitalization? The regula-
tions would only serve as guidelines for the IRS. Those guidelines will 
still be subject to interpretation by IRS agents, attorneys and other 
employees, because someone will have to determine if the item is reg-
ular and recurring. Unless a taxpayer's particular expenditure falls 
within a stated exception to the norm of capitalization, the IRS and 
the taxpayer may still disagree on whether or not the expenditure 
should be capitalized. Outside the stated exceptions there still exists 
the opportunity for taxpayers to face inconsistent interpretations. It 
would be impossible for the IRS to draft regulations that would cover 
every possible expenditure and determine if it should be deducted or 
capitalized. 
137. Hertz, supra note 132; see also Whitley, supra note 132. 
138. Hertz, supra note 132; see also Whitley, supra note 132. 
139. Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. U.S., 142 F.3d 973, 980 (7th Cir. 1998); see 
Aprill, supra note 108, at 63-64 and Coverdale, supra note 112, at 69-70 for a 
discussion of Chevron deference. 
140. With Chevron deference, the first step a court examining a regulation takes 
is to determine if Congress has spoken on the issue on point. See Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). If 
not, then the court determines if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 
See id. 
141. Apri II , supra note 108, at 64. 
142. See U.s. v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (stating that the judiciary's 
role is to make sure that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his au-
thority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable 
manner). 
143. U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH A REGULAR AND RECURRING RULE 
A. The "One-Year Rule" 
Part of the confusion surrounding the capitalization versus deduc-
tion issue involves a misunderstanding of what is commonly referred 
to as the "one-year rule."144 The proposed regulations suggest a 
twelve-month rule,145 which must be read in conjunction with the reg-
ular and recurring rule. Failure to do so, would suggest that a tax-
payer could deduct a regular and recurring item even if the 
expenditure created an asset that had a useful life of more than one 
year. Such a reading would avoid section 263 and the norm of 
capitalization.146 
The "one-year rule" arose out of the ninth circuit in Zaninovich v. 
Commissioner. 147 In Zaninovich, a cash basis taxpayer prepaid 12 
months of rent for farm property as required by the lease,148 which 
was also the custom in the area farming industry.149 The taxpayer 
sought to deduct the entire amount in the year paid, even though the 
rent was mostly allocable to the next tax year.150 The tax court de-
clined to permit the deduction. 151 However, the ninth circuit permit-
ted the deduction, stating: "[u]nder the ,'one-year rule' an 
expenditure is treated as a capital expenditure if it creates an asset, or 
secures a like advantage to the taxpayer, having a useful life in excess 
of one year."152 
The court distinguished between accrual method and cash method 
taxpayers. I53 The court noted that a difference in deductions for the 
two methods is that the accrual method requires deductions to be 
matched to income, whereas the cash method does not have the same 
requirement. 154 It emphasized that pro-ration is necessary for proper 
matching of income to expenses. 155 
The court then goes on to note that "the 'one-year rule' is strictly 
applied to allow a full deduction in the year of payment."156 Zani-
novich suggests that the court understood that the "one-year rule" did 
144. Compare U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 329, 337 (1999) 
(holding that the "one-year rule" does not apply to accrual method taxpay-
ers), with U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 
2001) (extending the "one-year rule" to accrual method taxpayers). 
145. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures 67 Fed. 
Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
146. See id. 
147. 616 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1980). 
148. [d. at 430. 
149. [d. at 430 n.2. 
150. [d. at 430. 
151. Zaninovich v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 605, 608 (1978). 
152. Zaninovich, 616 F.2d at 432. 
153. [d. at 431 n.5. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. at 432 n.6. 
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not apply to accrual method taxpayers, because as a general rule, their 
deductions are not tied to payment, like those of a cash method 
taxpayer. 157 
In addition to mistakenly applying the "one-year rule" to an accrual 
method taxpayer, the seventh circuit in US. Freightways failed to ac-
knowledge the additional requirements of the "one-year rule" that 
were created by the tax court in Grynberg v. Commissioner. 15s The cash 
method taxpayer in Grynberg attempted to deduct the prepayment of 
expenses that would have been deductible under section 162 as trade 
or business expenses.159 The tax court stated that when a deduction 
for a prepayment by a cash method taxpayer is considered under this 
section, then three requirements must be met. 160 
The first requirement is that the taxpayer must actually pay the ex-
pense.161 The next requirement is that the taxpayer must have a "sub-
stantial business reason" for prepayment of the expense and that the 
purpose for prepayment must be one other than to accelerate a de-
duction. 162 Finally, the last requirement mandates that the prepay-
ment cannot cause a material distortion in the taxable income of the 
taxpayer. 163 
Arguably, these requirements are for cash method taxpayers, and 
the court did not consider what requirements might apply to accrual 
method taxpayers. This court's lack of consideration of the accrual 
method taxpayers might suggest that the tax court did not contem-
plate application of the "one-year rule" to these taxpayers. Despite 
the limitation of these requirements to cash method taxpayers, the 
seventh circuit, when considering extending the "one-year rule" to ac-
crual method taxpayers, should have examined the purpose and in-
tent behind the additional requirements to ensure that taxpayers are 
treated consistently. By ignoring these additional requirements, the 
court created a loophole that accrual method taxpayers can use to 
avoid matching income to expenses. 
The proposed regulations also appear to disregard these additional 
requirements. It is unclear from the regulations if cash method tax-
payers would now be excused from meeting these requirements. 
157. Zaninovich, 616 F.2d at 431-32 nn.5-6. 
158. U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Grynberg v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 255 (1984)). 
159. Grynberg, 83 T.C. at 265 n.10. 
160. [d. at 265. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 266. 
163. [d. 
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B. Where Would the One-Year Rule Fit into the Internal Revenue Code? 
Because regulations modify and interpret existing code sections,164 
the regular and recurring regulation must fall under a particular code 
section. The regulation will not be able to stand on its own. This 
requirement necessitates that the authors of the regulation carefully 
consider the tax scheme of the code and properly fit in the regulation. 
The regulation'S author has two options for placement of the 
regulation. 
1. Would This Regulation Modify Section 263? 
The regulation could fall under the auspices of section 263, the 
code section known as the capitalization section. In essence, the regu-
lation would operate as an exception to the norm of capitalization. 
However, section 263 is not a deduction statute. In fact, it is just the 
opposite. Section 263 states: "[n]o deduction shall be allowed" and 
then lists capital expenditures in which deductions are not allowed.165 
Consequently, section 263 cannot operate as authority for expressly 
allowing a deduction; whereas in section 161, Congress specifically 
enumerated deductions allowed by the Code. 166 
Logic suggests that the IRS cannot use a non-deduction statute to 
create a deduction. Therefore, despite coming under the auspices of 
section 263, the regulation would need to be read together with an-
other code section in order to create a deduction. The obvious 
choice is section 162 -the trade or business expense section. 
2. Would This Regulation Modify Section 162? 
Another way to interpret the regulation is that it substitutes a recur-
ring element for the expense element. Under this interpretation, a 
taxpayer who is determining whether an expenditure is deductible 
under section 162 or must be capitalized under section 263, would be 
able to deduct the amount in full if the expenditure is regular and 
recurring in nature. It is unclear if a taxpayer would be required to 
determine if the deduction resulted in better matching or caused a 
material distortion in income. If this were the case, then there would 
no longer be a need for different methods of accounting. 
By adding this substitution to section 162, the IRS would be creating 
an exception that is in direct conflict with the spoken intent of Con-
gress. 167 Congress has spoken on the issue of recurring expenses with 
section 461 (h)(3), the recurring item exception. 168 
164. See generally Brennen, supra note 131, at 388-89. 
165. 26 U.S.C.A. § 263(a) (West 2002). 
166. See id.; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 161 (West 2002). 
167. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 461 (h) (3) (West 2002). 
168. Id. 
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C. How Would The One-Year Rule Interact with Other Code Requirements? 
1. How Would This New Rule Interact with and Impact the Congres-
sionally Created Recurring Item Exception of Section 461(h)(3)? 
In 1984, Congress added an economic performance requirement to 
the deduction of expenses for accrual method taxpayers.169 This re-
quirement was to take into account the time value of money and to 
prevent accrual method taxpayers from accelerating deductions by 
prepaying them.170 In general, economic performance requires that 
all the obligations tied to the expense be fulfilled. l7l For example, if 
the taxpayer hires an employee, economic performance would occur 
as that the employee provides services to the employer. 172 
Congress recognized that the economic performance requirement 
might hinder the normal operations of a business, so it created the 
recurring item exception to economic performance. 173 This excep-
tion would allow a taxpayer to deduct an expense prior to economic 
performance if economic performance would occur within a reasona-
ble period after the close of the tax year, or eight and one-half months 
after the close of the tax year.174 Congress also created three other 
requirements. 175 
Additionally, the item must be recurring in nature.176 It needs to 
be an expense that the taxpayer regularly incurs in business.177 Fur-
thermore, the taxpayer must have consistently treated it as deductible 
in the year that the all-events test is met.178 This requires that the 
taxpayer's treatment of the item for financial accounting as well as tax 
accounting should correspond. Finally, the item needed to be imma-
terial or that immediate deduction would result in a better matching 
of the expense to the income it generated. 179 
Was this what the seventh circuit had in mind when it held in U.S. 
Freightways that "ordinary, necessary, and recurring expenses for the 
business" would be deductible?180 Freightways qualified for a recurring 
169. 26 U.S.CA § 461(h) was added by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-369, § 91(a), 1984 U.S.C.CAN. (98 Stat.) 494,598-601. 
170. H.R. REp. No. 98-432 at 1254 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 697, 
917. 
171. For a detailed explanation of economic performance and the history of its 
enactment, see Erik M. Jensen, The Deduction Of Future Liabilities By Accrual-
Basis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals, The All Events Test, And Economic Perform-
ance, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 443 (1985). 
172. 26 U.S.CA § 461 (h) (2) (A)(i) (West 2002). 
173. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 873, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.CAN. 1445, 1561. 
174. 26 U.S.CA § 461(h)(3)(A)(ii) (West 2002). 
175. [d. § 461 (h)(3)(A)(iii) & (iv). 
176. [d. § 461 (h)(3)(A) (iii). 
177. U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137,1147 (7th Cir. 2001). 
178. 26 U.S.CA § 461 (h)(3)(A) (iii) (West 2002). 
179. [d. § 461(h)(3)(A)(iv). 
180. US. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1147. 
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item exception because the expenses at issue were fixed yearly ex-
penses.18I That being the case, it would suggest that the recurring 
nature the court was referring to was outside the scope of section 
461 (h) (3). Additionally, tying the recurring nature with ordinary and 
necessary it would appear that the court was adding a requirement to 
section 162. 
What is the effect of having a regular and recurring rule on the 
recurring item exception that Congress created? Would the regula-
tion replace the exception Congress created? If an item was recurring 
under the regulation would it be presumed to be recurring for pur-
poses of section 461 (h)(3)? Would a taxpayer no longer have to be 
concerned with the materiality or the matching of expenses to income 
if the item is recurring? 
A regular and recurring regulation that grants a deduction is not 
necessary, because Congress has already provided for it with section 
461(h)(3).182 Any regulation that runs counter to section 461(h)(3) 
would violate Congressional intent. Any regulation that replaces or 
usurps the recurring item exception will be overreaching its bounds. 
The regular and recurring regulation must take into account the in-
tent of Congress in requiring a lack of materiality or better matching 
for immediate deduction of recurring items. 
2. At What Point of Analysis Would a Taxpayer Input the New Regu-
lar and Recurring Rule? 
Another issue that needs to be clarified regarding the regular and 
recurring regulation is where it would fit in the analysis a taxpayer 
completes for each expenditure in determining if that expenditure is 
immediately deductible. Would the taxpayer first determine if section 
162 applies, then determine if the item is recurring? If that is the 
case, then the method of accounting the taxpayer uses would be im-
material. An accrual method taxpayer will be able to avoid the eco-
nomic performance requirement by characterizing the item as 
recurring. 
If the regular and recurring regulation is taken into account under 
the taxpayers' method of accounting, it will only be useful to accrual 
method taxpayers. Cash method taxpayers do not need a regular and 
recurring exception, because these taxpayers have the judicially cre-
ated "one-year rule."183 
So, would this regulation be used to treat accrual and cash method 
taxpayers equally? Doing so would ignore the diverse purposes and 
goals of the two different methods of accounting. The purpose of the 
181. Id. 
182. 26 U.S.C.A. § 461 (h)(3)(A)(iv) (West 2002). 
183. See U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1140. 
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cash metl).od of accounting is simplicity.184 The purpose of the ac-
crual method of accounting is to match the expenses of a business 
with the income that it produces. 185 There will be times when these 
various purposes create inconsistencies for different taxpayers. 
The placement of section 461 (h) (3) suggests that Congress recog-
nizes the recurring item exception as a timing element and only rele-
vant to accrual taxpayers. Therefore, Congress uses it as a substitute 
for economic performance, but still requires a clear reflection of in-
come or matching. Whereas a regular and recurring rule would do 
away with this clear reflection of income requirement, which is incon-
sistent with Congress' spoken iritent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is without question that taxpayers need guidance in determining 
whether to capitalize or currently deduct an expenditure. However, 
both the courts and the IRS have demonstrated a lack of consistency 
and a misunderstanding of the issues. Therefore, it is necessary for 
Congress to act to clarify the issues. It is only with a strong general 
rule that both the courts and the IRS will be able to provide guidance 
to taxpayers. 
The current state of the law is in such a shamble that neither the 
court nor the IRS can be expected to make cohesive, coherent guide-
lines. The IRS' efforts to provide the needed guidance, while lauda-
ble, are ill advised. This issue is one that requires the voice of 
Congress. 
184. Frank]. Slagle, Accountingfor Interest: An Analysis of Original Issue Discount in 
the Sale of Property, 32 S.D. L. REv. 1, 13 (1987). 
185. Joseph W. Blackburn, Fragmenting Cost Of Goods Sold For Accounting Accuracy 
And Tax Profits, 31 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 295 (1987). 
